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THE EC PROPOSAL TO MODIFY THE GATTI
ENVIRONMENT INTERFACE
BOB KAPANENt

There has to be a dear recognition in the GA TT of the
importance of the international environmental agenda,
which ensures a mutually supportive relationship between
the GATT and multilateral environmental agreements.
European Community (EC) Proposal
on Trade and the Environment. I
The interface between trade and environmental protection is vast
and interesting, and will inevitably be the focus of much debate in
the next few years as nations address the issue of how international
environmental agreements containing trade sanctions ought to interact with global trade policies.
While the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade2 (GATT)3
does not govern or regulate trade directly, it does regulate the
statutory and administrative rules which restrict or distort trade between GATT contracting parties. Environmental agreements containing trade sanctions which restrict or distort trade, will thereby
be vulnerable to challenges from GATT contracting parties on the
grounds that they violate trade provisions under GATT.
This note focuses on the fact that present and future multilateral
environmental agreements may be found GATT-inconsistent due to
t

B. Arts & Sc. (McMaster), LLB. anticipated 1995 (Dalhousie).

1 "EC Proposal on Trade and Environment" Inside U.S. Trade-Special Report
(27 November 1992) S-3 [hereinafter "EC Proposal"].
2 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Basic Instruments and Selected
Documents, vol. III (Geneva: GAIT, 1958), 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT].
3 As a brief history, GATT was created in 1947, as part of the post-World War
II international economic restructuring. The United Nations, World Bank and
International Monetary Fund were also created at this time. There are 111 contracting parties to the GATT, and additional countries abide by its terms.
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their restraints on trade. At present, the status of environmental
agreements is unclear because, while there are GATT decisions
illustrating how unilateral trade actions with environmental purposes
will be treated by GATT, there are as yet no GATT Panel decisions
on multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) to indicate how
they will be treated. 4 Given the present interpretation of
environmental exceptions under GATT, however, a strong argument
may be made that MEAs would likely be found GATT-inconsistent.5
The EC has therefore proposed a collective interpretation of a
GATT clause that would clarify the status of MEAs under GATT.
This note argues that the European Community's proposed
collective interpretation presents a unique opportunity for GATT
contracting parties to codify support for MEAs, and provide guidance in avoiding GATT-inconsistencies in future MEAs. Most importantly, GATT contracting parties have an opportunity to ensure that
the overly restrictive criteria established in previous GATT Panel
decisions, regarding unilateral environmental actions, are not applied to MEAs.
Multilateral Environmental Agreements
The GATT Group on Environmental Measures and International
Trade found that of the 127 multilateral agreements concerning the
environment, 17 of them have trade provisions. 6 The three most
significant of these are the Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora7 , the Montreal Protocol
on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer and the Basel

Convention.9
4

The EC makes the odd statement that "[t]he legitimacy of trade measures taken
pursuant to [an MEA] has not been questioned in the GATI ." "EC Proposal," supra
note 1 at S-3. Does the EC mean to imply that MEAs will not be questioned-that
they are immune to GATI challenges? While it is true that no contracting parties
have dared to challenge an MEA, that does not imply that such a challenge could
not be brought.
5 See infra notes 18-29 and accompanying text.
6 GATT Secretariat, Trade and the Environment, GATT Doc. 1529 (13
February 1992) at 10.
7 The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna
and Flora, 3March1973, 12 I.L.M. 1085.
8 Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, 16 September
1987, 26 I.L.M. 1541 [hereinafter Montreal
See also Vienna Convention
for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, 22 March 1985, 26 I.L.M. 1529; Amendment
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The EC proposes, upon examination of these three MEAs, "[that]
the rationale for trade measures has been to ensure the effective
implementation of commitments to protect the environment" 10 and
to ensure that environmental commitments established in MEAs
would not be undermined or nullified by actions of non-parties to
the MEA.
GATT Article XX
GA TT does not specifically refer to the environment. 11 The most
relevant measures, regarding environmental policies, are the
"General Exceptions" provisions of article XX of GATT.
The article XX exception "applies only to measures inconsistent
with another provision of the General Agreement." 12 Article XX(b)
provides an exception for measures "necessary to protect human,
animal or plant life or health."13 Article XX(g) provides an exception for measures "relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural
resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with
restrictions on domestic production or consumption." 14 These
measures are permissible so long as they do not "constitute a means
of arbitrary or unjustified discrimination between countries where
the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction of international trade." 15 These two article XX provisions allow for environmental exceptions to be made for otherwise GATT-inconsistent
trade policies.
GATT Panels have interpreted the two environmental exception
prov1s1ons in GA TT challenges to unilateral trade actions.
Challenges against unilateral trade actions have been highly
to the Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, 29 June 1990,

S.M.T. 2:316.
9 Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous
Wastes and their Disposal, 22 March 1989, 28 I.L.M. 657.
IO "EC Proposal," supra note 1 at S-3.
11 Protection of the environment is not specifically stated in art. XX for
historical reasons, and it is felt by the EC that the "public policy objectives
reflected in XX(b) and XX(g) are broad enough to encompass the objectives of
environmental protection." "EC Proposal," supra note 1 at S-4.
12 GA TT Panel Report, Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, GA TT Doc.
365/345 (7 November 1989) [hereinafter Section 337] at 50, para. 5.9.
13 GATT, supra note 2, art. XX.

14

15

Ibid
Ibid
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successful. At present, there are no compelling reasons why a GATT
challenge brought against the trade restrictions imposed under an
MEA would be treated differently from a GATT challenge against
unilateral trade actions. Concern for the status of MEAs is thus
warranted. The collective interpretation of article XX ought to
define a new test for MEAs, or else international efforts directed at
establishing and maintaining MEAs will be frustrated by individual
nations pursuing complaints under GATT.

Growing Support for MEAs
In the past few decades, nations dissatisfied with
extrajurisdictional environmental regulation will either attempt to
negotiate an MEA with other nations, addressing the problem, or
they will attempt to impose standards unilaterally, which generally
materialize in the form of non-tariff trade measures.
At present there exists a broad consensus 16 among GATT contracting parties that international environmental problems should be
addressed by means of MEAs.17 It is ironic therefore that existing
MEAs are presently susceptible to being found GATT-inconsistent.
16

There also presently exists a dispute between the United States and the
European Community over the use of unilateral trade actions to address international environmental problems. This dispute has had the unfortunate effect of
delaying any sort of agreement on how the GATT ought to address the trade and
environment nexus. "GATT Environment Work Delayed by Dispute Over
Unilateral Action" Inside U.S. Trade-Special Report (13 November 1992) S-1.
As of October 1993, it is reported that "[t]he U.S. has been alone in the GATT
in trying to establish a legal basis for a country to impose trade restrictions
unilaterally to protect the environment beyond its borders" Inside U.S. TradeSpecial Report (15 October 1993) S-1.
!7 This is indicated in the three non-legally binding agreements adopted at the
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development. Two of these
agreements contain the following passage:
Unilateral actions to deal with environmental challenges
outside the jurisdiction of the importing country should be
avoided. Environmental measures addressing international
environmental problems should, as far as possible, be based on
an international consensus.
Principle 12 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development; Proceedings
of the Main Committee; Agenda 21, Chapter 2, Para. 22(i) and c. 39 para. 34. This
passage was originally taken from paragraph 152 of the Declaration of the
UNCTAD VIII in Cartagena. See "GATT Document on Earth Summit" Inside
U.S. Trade-SpecialReport(13 November 1992) S-5, S-6.
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The Montreal Protocol provides a good example of an MEA being found GAIT-inconsistent. Parties to the Montreal Protocol have
agreed to reduce their use and production of ozone-depleting substances in a series of stages, toward their overall elimination by
1995. 18 The Montreal Protocol does not contain any restrictions on
trade between parties, but there are powerful restrictions on trade
between parties and non-parties, which are quite controversial.
Parties to GA TT are required to restrict exports in the
following manner: ban the export of controlled substances to nonparties; 19 discourage the export to non-parties of "technology for
producing or for utilizing controlled substances"; 20 and refrain from
providing various forms of aid that would support the export of
such equipment, plants or technology which facilitate the production
of the controlled substances. 21 These measures violate article XI,
which prohibits quantitative restrictions on imports and exports.2 2
In regards to imports, GATT-parties are to ban progressively
imports from non-parties of the following items: ozone depleting
substances23; products which contain these substances; 24 and possibly
products produced with, but not containing, such substances,
provided that the ban is feasible. 25 The underlying rationale for
these import restrictions is to ensure commitment to reduced domestic consumption, and to ensure that non-parties are not deriving
economic benefits from their own export of controlled substances. 26

18 Montreal Protocol, supra note 8. The original deadline was the year 2000,
which was subsequently moved forward.
19

Ibid. art. 4.2.

20 Ibid. art. 4.5.
21 Ibid. art. 4.6. It may be noted that the Montreal Protocol article 4.7 ensures that
articles 4.5 and 4.6 do not backfire: "Paragraphs 5 and 6 shall not apply co
products, equipment, plants or technology that improve the containment,
recovery, recycling, or destruction of controlled substances .... "
22 The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development. The

Effectiveness ofInternational Environmental Agreements: A Survey ofExisting Legal
Instruments (Cambridge [Eng.]: Grotius, 1992) at 487 [hereinafter UNCED
Survey Report].
23 Montreal Protoco4 supra note 8, art. 4.1.
24 Ibid. art. 4.3.
25 Ibid. art. 4.4.
2 6 J. McDonald "Greening the GATT: Harmonizing Free Trade and
Environmental Protection in the New World Order" (1993) 23 Envtl. L. 397 at
451.
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The import measures violate the most-favoured-nation principle
because they discriminate against products on the basis of their national origin. Imports from non-parties are to be progressively
banned. The import measures also violate the national treatment
principle because imports are discriminated against based upon
their production process. Although a domestic product, produced
without the use of a controlled substance, may be more environmentally friendly than an imported product which is produced using a controlled substance, they are nonetheless "like products."27
The import measures also violate article XI, since they impose
quantitative restrictions on imports. 28
Since these MEA provisions are inconsistent with GATT, the next
step, in a GATT Panel analysis, would be to assess whether an exemption under GA TT article XX is appropriate. 29 This leaves the
MEA in a precarious situation, especially since the GATT Panel
decisions interpreting article XX, as discussed below, would not
provide an exemption for an MEA such as the Montreal Protocol. A
viable solution, however, has been offered to solve this dilemma:
through clarification of the article XX test.
EC Proposed Solution: Collective Interpretation of Article XX
To assist in interpreting article XX the EC proposed the creation of
relevant interpretive materials.3° Specifically, the EC stated that
"GATT members should interpret Article XX ... to set out clear
criteria on the use of trade measures to enforce MEAs."3 1
The EC emphasized that "article XX must define the circumstances under which trade sanctions taken pursuant to an MEA, and
applied to a GATT member which did not sign the MEA, can go
27

These conclusions assume that a trade measure is pursued under article 4.4 of
the Montreal Protocol and that the Tuna-Dolphin Panel's interpretation of "like
products" is applied.
28 UNCED Survey Report, supra note 22 at 487.
2 9 Section 337, supra note 12.
30 The interpretation problem may be addressed through interpretive
materials. In addition to interpreting the words provided in the General
Agreement, there are Annexes to the General Agreement which provide
interpretive materials to various clauses in the GATT. These materials must be
considered authoritative, and be held to nearly as high a standing as the actual
GATT dauses. See J. H. Jackson, World Trade and the Law of GA TT
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1969) at 20.
31 "EC Proposal," supra note 1 at S-1.
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against other GATT obligations of maintaining an open trading system."32 Such an approach appears logical, as it would reduce uncertainty about how trade measures may be used, and ought to be
used, under MEAs. There is very broad support for this proposal. 33
Interpretation of General Exceptions

Extensive interpretation of the "General Exceptions" is provided by
the Panel Report in United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna34
The facts,35 decision, 36 and net effect37 of this dispute have been
discussed and criticized extensively in many artides3 8 and will not
be discussed in this note. Discussion is warranted, however, on the
tests that GA TT Panel Decisions have developed in regards to
unilateral environmental actions. A collateral test ought to be
developed specifically for MEAs, because the tests applied to
unilateral trade actions are inappropriate.
EXTRAJURISDICTIONAL APPLICATION

In the Tuna-Dolphin dispute, the GATT Panel ruled that article XX
exemptions do not have "extrajurisdictional" application, but may
32

Ibid.

33 "GATT Environment Group Postpones Work Until End of Uruguay Round"
Inside U.S. Trade-Special Report(l5 October 1993) S-1.
34 GATT Panel Report, United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT
Doc. DS21/R (3 September 1991) [hereinafter Tuna-Dolphin].
35 The dispute involved import provision of the U.S. Marine Mammal
Protection Act of 1972 (MMPA). The MMPA bans the importation of fish caught
using techniques which result in an incidental kill of ocean mammals in excess
of U.S. practices. In 1990, following a court order, an import ban was imposed on
yellowfin tuna and tuna products caught by Mexican vessels using purse seine nets
in the Eastern Tropical Pacific. Ibid.
36 The Panel found that the MMPA import and intermediary restrictions violated GATT art. III (national treatment) and art. XI (quantitative restrictions).
37 As Mexico did not want to jeopardize its negotiations of a trade agreement
with the US, the US administration convinced President Salinas to not seek adoption of the GATT Council Report.
3 8 See S. M. Spracker & D. C. Lundsgaard "Dolphins and Tuna: Renewed
Attention on the Future of Free Trade and Protection of the Environment"
(1993) 18 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 385; Ted L. McDorman "The 1991 U.S.-Mexico
GATT Panel Report On Tuna and Dolphin: Implications For Trade and
Environment Conflicts" (1992) 17 N.C. J. Int'! L. & Com. Reg. 461; McDonald,
supra note 26.
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only be invoked by a country to protect living organisms or natural
resources within that country's borders. The Panel stated that the
intended use of XX(b) is for "sanitary measures to safeguard life or
health of humans, animals or plants within the jurisdiction of the
importing country."39
The Panel held that the same reasoning applies for article XX(g),
whereby "[a] country can effectively control the production or consumption of an exhaustible natural resource only to the extent that
the production or consumption is under its jurisdiction." 40 One
commentator claims that this interpretation is incorrect because the
resource need only be consumed in the domestic market, as the exception is phrased as "production or consumption." 41 In other words,
regardless of where the product is produced, if it's being consumed
domestically then it is within that nation's jurisdiction to control
it's imports of that exhaustible natural resource.
The EC Proposal "firmly supports the conclusions of the Tuna
Panel Report[,] ... " including the rule that "a country should not
unilaterally restrict imports on the basis of environmental damage
that does not impact on a country's territory." 42 While the collective interpretation of article XX may support the Tuna-Dolphin decision with respect to unilateral actions, a distinction must be made
for multilateral actions. The Tuna-Dolphin Panel held that article
XX exceptions do not have extrajurisdictional application without
acknowledging that MEAs may have extrajurisdictional application.
In other words, the Panel held that a nation may only protect the
territory within its jurisdiction. 43 While the collective interpretation of article XX may condone the Tuna-Dolphin decision, a caveat
should be made that MEAs with extrajurisdictional application may
qualify for exemption under article XX despite any contrary impressions, regarding unilateral trade actions, given by the TunaDolphin Panel.
Suggestions

Essentially, the GATT Panel did not want individual contracting
parties dictating life or health protection policies with which other
39 Tuna-Dolphin, supra note 34 at 45, para. 5.26.
Ibid at 47, para. 5.31.
McDonald, supra note 26 at 442.
"EC Proposal," supra note 1 at S-3.
43 See Tuna-Dolphin, supra note 34 at 34, para. 5.26 and at 47, para. 5.31-5.32.
40

41
42
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contracting parties would have to comply to retain their GATT
rights. 44 However, the prohibition on extrajurisdictional application
could pose difficulties for MEAs created to protect the environment
of entire regions of the globe, much less areas beyond the
jurisdiction of any one nation. By definition the extrajurisdictional
test ought not apply to MEAs because MEAs are international in
scope. Many environmental effects cannot be contained locally, but
have some impact upon the global ecosystem. Comments by some
interested third parties support this view. 45 The UNCED Survey
Report argues that extra-territorial application is needed for territorial protection. For example, although the trade provisions of the
Montreal Protocol apply extrajurisdictionally, one could argue that
"depletion of the extra-territorial ozone layer is harmful to the
territorial environment." 46 A nation, therefore, has an interest in
environmental degradation beyond their territory for the sake of
those extra-territorial regions themselves, and for the sake of spillover effects on the nation's own territory.
NECESSITY
Article XX(b) only excepts those measures that conflict with other
GATT provisions if the measures are necessary in order to protect the
life or health of humans, animals or plants. The collective interpretation of article XX should clarify which trade restrictions are acceptable under an MEA by specifying the test to be used in assessing
necessity. The Tuna-Dolphin Panel interpreted necessary narrowly,
following another Panel Report, 47 stating that the objectives of article XX(b) were:
44

This is consistent with the sovereignty of states doctrine, but it becomes
more complicated once responsibility for environmental spill-overs is
considered.
4 5 Australia commented that "Controls on trade flows necessary to give effect to
international conventions ... should be considered as incidental to GATT obligations. However, where a contracting party takes a measure with extraterritorial
application outside of any international framework of cooperation, it is
appropriate for the GA TT to scrutinize the measure against that party's
obligations under the General Agreement." See Tuna-Dolphin, supra note 34 at
26, para. 4.1.
46 UNCED Survey Report, supra note 22 at 488.
47 GATT Panel Report, Thailand-Restrictions on Importation of and Internal
Taxes on Cigarettes, GATT Doc. DSlO/R (7 November 1990).
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to allow contracting parties to impose trade restrictive
measures inconsistent with the General Agreement to
pursue overriding public policy goals to the extent that
such inconsistencies were unavoidable [emphasis added]. 48

Following the reasoning of yet another Panel 49, the TunaDolphin Panel added that the party invoking an article XX exception
must demonstrate that it has "exhausted all options reasonably available50 to it to pursue its [objectives] through measures consistent
with the General Agreement... " [my emphasis].5 1 The test adopted
by the Tuna-Dolphin Panel may be restated as requiring that the
trade actions were unavoidable, since all other options to achieve the
environmental objective were exhausted.
The Section 337 Panel had previously stated that if no GATTconsistent measure was reasonably available, then the contracting
party would have to use the measure that "entails the least degree of
inconsistency with other GATT provisions." 52 While it could be
difficult to justify trade measures taken pursuant to an MEA as being
unavoidable, it would be easier to justify the trade measure as being
the least GATT -inconsistent of various alternatives to achieving the
environmental goal. This Panel also held that the "necessary" test
must focus specifically upon the trade measure as opposed to the
overall system.5 3 The EC Proposal supports the notion that
"necessary" relate specifically to the trade measure and not the
overall goal or policy.54
Suggestions
The EC recommends that "the trade measure applied should not be
more restrictive than it is necessary to achieve a public policy goal
Tuna-Dolphin, supra note 34 at 45, para. 5.27.
Section 337, supra note 12.
50 Commentators note that assessment of the likelihood of success of GATT consistent alternatives is subjective. See McDonald, supra note 26 at 435. For example, if negotiated settlements are not working, how long must a contracting
party pursue GATT -consistent alternatives before trade measures are deemed
necessary?
5l Tuna-Dolphin, supra note 34 at 46, para 5.28.
52 Section 337, supra note 12 at 60, para. 5.26.
53 To rule otherwise would "permit contracting.parties to introduce GATT
inconsistencies that are not necessary simply by making them part of a scheme
which contained elements that are necessary." Ibid., para. 5.27.
54 Ibid.
48
49

GATT I ENVIRONMENT INTERFACE

227

as encompassed in article XX." 55 The problem is that the Proposal
does not specify what standard is intended for judging what is
necessary. Does the test require that the trade actions were unavoidable, since all other options were exhausted, or that the trade actions
impose the least-degree of GATT-inconsistency?
It is submitted that the least-degree of GATT-inconsistency test
would be the most effective because it is inappropriate to ask a
large group of nations whether their mutually agreed upon MEA is an
unavoidable measure.5 6 Likewise, if the nations have assembled and
put their collective minds to addressing an international environmental issue, it is quite likely that all other feasible options were
exhausted. If nations had other options that involved less effort than
negotiating and implementing an MEA, while imposing no worse
trade effects, then those options would likely have been pursued.
The essence of GATT members' concerns revolve around protectionist trade policies. As the EC Proposal states, "the fact that
such [trade] measures have been discussed and agreed multilaterally
is the best guarantee against the risk of protectionist abuses or that
unnecessary trade restrictions will be introduced" [emphasis
added].57
The evaluation of "necessity" would be improved if the challenged trade measure could be interpreted in light of the urgency of
the international environmental objective. For example, if time is
of the essence in a particular environmental emergency, it would
seem logical that more extreme trade measures would be appropriate, despite the fact that the general environmental objective could
be pursued, less effectively and less quickly, by less trade restrictive
measures.
There are other problems regarding the standards to be used by
GATT Panels in assessing the "necessity" of trade actions. For example, should scientific studies be conducted to provide evidence
that the trade measure pursued was necessary and unavoidable relative to the other options? What weight will such studies be given?
55 "EC Proposal," supra note 1 at S-5.
If a group of nations decide to make a particular environmental objective a
priority and create an MEA to achieve that goal, then a GAIT Panel would probably consider the resulting MEA to be a necessary measure. However, the resulting
MEA may not be unavoidable as there is always the option of the nations not
taking any action to address the issue.
57 "EC Proposal," supra note 1 at S-5.
56
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Should an independent collaboration be required of such studies.
Could one trade measure be deemed necessary merely because
studies show that alternative trade measures would be too inconvenient or costly to administer?
PROCESS AND PRODUCTION METHODS (PPMS)
Some GATT provisions require that like products be treated alike,
regardless of where they were made and how they were made.
Although PPMs do not directly relate to article XX, they are extremely relevant to environmental and conservation measures.
The Tuna-Dolphin decision established that the relevant GATT
provisions only involved "those measures that are applied to the
product as such."5 8 Regulations distinguishing products on any other
basis than the physical characteristics of the product itself, were
found to be inconsistent with the "like product" provisions.59 The
PPMs, involving the rate at which dolphins were injured or killed by
boats fishing for tuna, did not affect tuna as a product.
The Panel established that article XX can only be applied to the
product facing the trade restriction, not to the circumstances under
which the product was produced or harvested. The Panel held that
the regulations aimed at protecting dolphins,
could not be regarded as being applied to tuna products
as such because they would not directly regulate the sale
of tuna and could not possibly affect tuna as a product. 60

Exceptions must be made for PPMs, however, because measures
taken against supposedly environmentally-friendly products that are
produced in an environmentally unfriendly manner, will otherwise
be GATT-inconsistent. For example, the potential ban on products
produced with but not containing ozone-depleting substances under
the Montreal Protocol would likely be declared GA TTinconsistent.

58 Tuna-Dolphin, supra note

34 at 41, para. 5.14.

59 The Tuna-Dolphin Panel found that the U.S. import prohibition could not
be considered an internal regulation under art. III because it concerned the
process of tuna harvesting instead of tuna as a product. See Tuna-Dolphin, supra
note 34 at 39-42, para. 5.8-5.16.
60 Tuna-Dolphin, supra note 34 at 41, para. 5.14.
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The EC proposal would allow trade restrictions under article XX
based on production processes "under certain circumstances."61
These circumstances would include consideration of whether other
members of the MEA are applying such controls on production, or
whether other forms of trade control are insufficient to achieve the
goals of the MEA.62
Suggestions
The EC Proposal represents significant progress in acknowledging
the need for MEAs to effect change in the PPMs of various products.
The GATT contracting parties should adopt this provision in order
to support MEAs that tackle environmentally hazardous PPMs. After
all, at one level, product distinction based upon PPMs already exists. Many companies are realizing that their sales may be boosted
by advertising or labelling their environmentally-safe production
processes. Why would the international trade regime want to deny
this trend? A nation's trade policies ought to be able to reflect the
PPM policy-choices that the country has made. It should be possible
to incorporate limited PPM-based exceptions into article XX
without opening the floodgates to protectionism.
The EC Proposal must clarify the circumstances in which PPMs
will qualify as article XX exceptions. A good approach would be to
expand the definition of "product" to encompass the life cycle of
the product. 63 This would imply that products which only differ in
the environmental effects of their PPMs would not be like products.
Such distinctions between products would not be unduly burdensome, but would allow trading partners to pursue and enforce
PPM-policies under MEAs.
CONCLUSIONS

It is recommended that GATT contracting parties help facilitate
the creation and effective operation of MEAs, by establishing clear,
flexible criteria upon which trade sanctions used to enforce MEAs
will not be frustrated under GATT. Specifically, MEAs ought not to
6I

"EC Proposal," supra note 1 at S-5.

62 Ibid.

63 R. Housman & D. Zaelke "Trade, Environment, and Sustainable
Development: A Primer" (1992) 15 Hastings Int'! & Comp. L. Rev. 535 at 605.
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be restricted by the extrajurisdictionality test that has arisen from
GATT Panel decisions: MEAs are international in scope and often involve environmental concerns that are not limited to one confined
territory. The EC Proposal must acknowledge the manner in which
an extrajurisdictionality test could suppress MEA development. The
necessary test ought to incorporate the standard of least-degree of
GATT inconsistency, in preference to other standards that have been
used which require that the trade action was unavoidable, or resulted
from the exhaustion of all other options. Process and production
methods ought to be incorporated into the collective interpretation.
The EC Proposal represents great progress in this area. The
circumstances under which PPMs are excepted will have to be
specified. A suggested starting point is the consideration of the
life-cycle of a product.

